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Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on
the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these
emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak
in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out
those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else
does? This paper contends that such cases do not necessarily challenge the idea that
shame and pride are about the emoting subject. Rather, we claim that some of the most
paradigmatic scenarios of shame and pride induced by others can be accommodated
by taking seriously the consideration that, in such cases, the subject “group-identifies”
with the other. This is the idea that, in feeling these forms of shame or pride, the subject
is conceiving of herself as a member of the same group as the subject acting shamefully
or in an admirable way. In other words, these peculiar emotive responses are elicited in
the subject insofar as, and to the extent that, she is (or sees herself as being) a member
of a group – the group to which those who act shamefully or admirably also belong. By
looking into the way in which the notion of group identification can allow for an account
of hetero-induced shame and pride, this paper attempts to achieve a sort of mutual
enlightenment that brings to light not only an important and generally neglected form of
self-conscious emotions, but also relevant features of group identification. In particular, it
generates evidence for the idea that group identification is a psychological process that
the subject does not have to carry out intentionally in the sense that it is not necessarily
triggered by the subject’s conative states like desires or intentions.
Keywords: shame, pride, group identification, self-conscious emotions, social self
INTRODUCTION
The traditional account of shame and pride describes these emotions as self-conscious, i.e., as
emotions that are intentionally directed at the very subject that feels them. But how can this account
explain cases in which these phenomena, supposedly, are about others, i.e., cases in which the
subject feels proud or ashamed of others?1 This paper has two main goals. The first is to show
that the traditional account can successfully explain these cases if it is supplemented by a theory of
group identification, where ‘group identification’ refers to the process that leads the emoting subject
to understand herself as being member of a group (and, in the cases at stake, of the group to which
1Pride and shame are not the only self-conscious emotions, but they are the only two we focus on here. Other examples
include embarrassment, guilt, humiliation, and envy. Not all of them would clearly qualify as “emotions of self-assessment”
in Taylor’s (1985) sense and we leave it to further investigations whether they can be hetero-induced.
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the admirable or shameful others belong). The second goal is to
employ such an account to shed light on group identification
itself and, more specifically, to show that this is not an intentional
process in the sense that it is not necessarily prompted and steered
by conative states like the intention or the desire to belong to a
group. For one can be trapped by one’s social identity, as it were.
To secure these insights, the paper proceeds as follows. In
the first Section of the paper, the traditional account of shame
and pride is introduced by focusing on the intentional structure
of these emotions. In the second Section, the attention turns to
pride induced by others – it is contended that this is an emotional
response of a genuine kind and that, thus, it cannot be reduced to
emotions with a different intentional structure or of an altogether
different kind. One way to explain this form of pride, it is argued
further, is by looking into the process of group identification –
the subject, because she group-identifies, acquires a social self or
identity, and it is such social self that her emotion of pride is
about. In the third Section, this conclusion about hetero-induced
pride is considered in the light of a psychological hypothesis
according to which group identification is driven by a desire
to achieve or maintain a positive social identity (cf. Tajfel and
Turner, 1986). The following Sections peruse this hypothesis in
the light of hetero-induced shame. If, as it is contended in Section
4, hetero-induced shame is an emotional response of a specific
kind, then the conclusion we draw is that group identification
is not necessarily triggered by a desire to attain or preserve a
positive social identity: such a desire could well be a psychological
factor in the case of hetero-induced pride, due to the fact that this
is a positive emotion responding to what the subject perceives
to be positive traits of a group to which she, then, wishes to be
associated. However, as Section 5 shows, the fact that shame is
an unpleasant emotion correlated to features of group identity
perceived by the subject as negative, illustrates that such desire
is not a necessary triggering factor of group identification. The
paper ends by arguing that, if the desire to establish a positive
social identity does not necessarily motivate group identification,
then it is hard to see which other desires from the side of the
subject might be able to motivate such a psychological process. If
this consideration is on the right track, then it suggests that group
identification is not necessarily an intentional process because it
does not have to be triggered by conative states like intentions
and desires.
SHAME AND PRIDE AS
SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS
Despite the many rival views on the matter, in this paper we assign
a central role in the characterization of emotions to appraisals
or evaluations. This is in line with very widespread views in
philosophy, and psychology too (cf. mainly appraisal theorists
such as Scherer and Ekman, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985;
Frijda, 1986, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2009, 2013; Moors
et al., 2013). Another widespread claim we also endorse in this
paper is that emotions are intentional: insofar as these mental
states are directed at objects and facts, they can be said to be
about or of objects and facts (de Sousa, 2013). A peculiar class
of emotions encompasses so-called “self-conscious emotions,” the
peculiarity of which is that their intentional object coincides
with the subject that feels them (cf. e.g., Kristjánsson, 2010,
p. 77–85; Zahavi, 2012). Paradigmatic cases of self-conscious
emotions are shame and pride: if I am ashamed or proud, I am
ashamed or proud of myself. Some theorists also call shame and
pride “emotions of self-assessment,” because they imply a self-
evaluation by the emoting subject: whereas, in shame, I assess
myself negatively, in pride, I assess myself positively (cf. Taylor,
1985; Tangney, 2005; Deonna et al., 2011). This is not supposed
to insinuate that pride, shame and other self-conscious emotions
are always products of self-reflection, of a mental process of
rumination and almost solipsistic evaluation of oneself. Indeed,
most instances of pride and shame are highly situational and they
take the subject by surprise; this fact has even lead some authors
to argue that these emotions may very well and often are pre-
reflective (cf. Sartre, 1969). Indeed, some appraisal theorists argue
that appraisal processes can often be automatic (cf. Anderson,
1992; Moors, 2010; Moors et al., 2013, p. 122). All that is meant
here is that the situation that gives rise to self-conscious emotions
is such that it urges the focus of the experience and the evaluation
to turn onto the emoting subject. Accordingly, they differ from
other emotions, like fear, whose focus and evaluation are, so to
speak, “out there” in the world (if I’m afraid of the rabid dog, my
experience focuses on it and evaluates it as threatening).
At this point, it might be important to highlight that all
emotions are self-involving in some sense, they imply a relation
between self and object, and often a triangular relation that
includes also others (cf. Manstead and Fischer, 2001). This
view is well articulated in appraisal theories of emotion, and
many philosophers have developed theories that include similar
components (cf. e.g., Helm, 2001; Roberts, 2003). Roughly, the
idea is that all emotions involve the concerns of the emoting
subject, they arise because the subject appraises the situation as
having a significant impact on something she cares about, in
the sense that the situation affects her. Thus fear does involve a
concern for oneself. And yet, it doesn’t involve a self-evaluation.
In fear, a situation is appraised as threatening to me or someone
or something I care about. In pride and shame, by contrast,
the situation is experienced as revealing that I am, respectively,
superior or inferior, outstanding or degraded. . . and these are all
evaluations of myself.
All of the above makes the intentional structure of shame
and pride virtually symmetrical: if, on the one hand, their
phenomenological qualities are basically opposite (one being
positive, the other negative), the way in which they relate to
facts and objects, on the other hand, is almost parallel.2 Two
2Not everybody agrees on this, though. Tracy and Robins (2007), for example,
claim that pride (as opposed to shame) is subdivided in two clearly distinct types,
“authentic pride” and “hubristic pride,” involving very different action tendencies
and functions, whose opposite emotions are, respectively, guilt and shame. What
they call “authentic pride” would not be intentionally parallel to shame, but to
guilt. Other authors suggest a different way in which shame and guilt might not
be parallel: namely, they take one of the self-conscious emotions to be more basic
than others, and to form the ground from which others derive. Tomkins (1995,
p. 397–410) could be read as suggesting that pride, as a positively valenced affect,
is prior to shame, since he believes that shame arises from the thwarting of positive
affect. Sartre (1969, p. 290–91), on the other hand, argues that shame is primary,
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considerations can further illustrate the symmetry between these
emotions. First, both emotions entail the sense that one is in
the spotlight, that something about oneself is being revealed and
brought to the fore (Kristjánsson, 2010, p. 77). However, whilst
in pride one is typically satisfied about it and shows it off, in
shame one wishes and seeks to hide it again. In pride, one feels
an expansion of the self, a swelling, and a desire to share the good
news or show to others the good qualities that make the subject
proud (although this reaction can be constrained by culture). In
shame, exactly the opposite happens: the body adopts a collapsed
position, one hides one’s face and wishes to run away or sink
through the ground and disappear from the view of others.
Granted, this characterization does not account for the
complexity of pride and shame, which can come in much
more intricate forms. Sometimes pride can be uncomfortable or
mixed with embarrassment, especially if one feels one is being
excessively praised, and sometimes shame can be mixed with
pleasure, as might be the case in the first sexual encounters of
a young person. Such complexity, however, only strengthens the
hypothesis of a structural similarity between them. It does so
by pointing toward the idea that these emotions build upon the
same ground: if considered from a developmental perspective,
self-conscious affectivity appears to be rather ambivalent –
the first coy reactions of babies seem to indicate that their
feelings are neither entirely pleasant nor entirely unpleasant (cf.
Reddy, 2000). Later on the reactions and experiences appear
to differentiate and become hedonically “purer” (Reddy, 2008,
p. 120–149), although many stay mixed even in adulthood.
The suggestion of an intrinsic similarity between shame and
pride can be supported by a second consideration: the intentional
structure displayed by these emotions is peculiar and makes
them different from simpler emotions like, e.g., fear. The latter
shows a relatively simple structure: if a child is afraid of darkness,
then her fear is intentionally directed at darkness as something
threatening. The expression “as something threatening”3 is meant
to capture the idea, widespread in the literature, that emotions
enter relations with so called “formal objects” (cf. Kenny,
2003, p. 134), which provide adequacy criteria for emotions:
accordingly, fear is adequate if it responds to an object which is
threatening; anger if relates to the object as offensive, and so on.
Self-conscious emotions, by contrast, are more complex
insofar as they involve a subdivision of their intentional objects
into the object proper and what one may call the cause of the
emotion (Hume, 1978; Taylor, 1985). Imagine that you are a
scientist that, after years of efforts and hard work, wins the Nobel
Prize for Physics, and you feel proud of it. In this case, the best
way of capturing the intentional structure of your emotion is
not by saying simply that you are proud of the prize. Your pride
does not merely focus on the prize in the same way in which fear
and all other self-conscious emotions, including notably pride, are transformations
of it. This is no place to make a detailed evaluation of these views, whose theoretical
presuppositions are too far from the subject of this paper. Suffice it to say that
neither our analysis of the intentional structure of pride and shame, nor empirical
findings in developmental psychology (cf. Reddy, 2008, p. 120–49) seem to clearly
support the primacy of one of these emotions over the other.
3Some authors deny that emotions have propositional contents, while still holding
that they involve evaluation or appraisal (cf. Prinz, 2004).
focuses on threatening objects, it rather focuses on the winning
of the prize, which is something you did, and which directly
reflects upon you. It is plausible to contend that, without this
connection, you wouldn’t feel pride. Such a structure is essential
to these emotions: you feel proud of yourself because you won the
prize. You are the object of your pride, and the cause or occasion
makes you evaluate yourself positively (cf. Hume, 1978; Taylor,
1985). Shame has the same structure. Imagine a teenager who
was ashamed of his acne. His shame doesn’t focus on the features
of a young face covered in pimples (indeed, he might even be
inclined to make fun of them if he saw them on someone else);
it focuses on the fact that it is his face, and this leads to a negative
evaluation of himself. He is ashamed of himself because his face
is unattractively covered in pimples.
In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume (1978, p. 277–290)
analyzes both pride and shame along the lines sketched above.4
According to him, both have a primary intentional object (the
emoting subject) and a cause. But for the cause to give rise to a
self-conscious emotion (like pride or shame), and not to another
type of emotion (admiration or disgust), the cause must be, as
he says, “closely related” to the emoting subject, or, one could
add, it must at least be experienced as such (Hume, 1978, p. 291).
Many different things can serve here as a cause: a feature, an
action, an object, a situation, as long as it bears this close relation
to the emoting subject. The crucial point is not what type of
thing or event it is, but such close relation to the subject. This
relation implies something more than the mere subject-object
relation, which the subject’s concerns make intrinsic to basically
all emotions. When Hume refers to the close relation between
subject and cause in this context, he doesn’t merely refer to an
impact on concerns. He rather means that there is a link of some
kind that allows for the evaluation deserved by the cause to be
transferred to the emoting subject: if the cause produces pleasant
impressions in me, I will feel good about myself, and therefore
feel proud, and if these impressions are unpleasant, I will feel
bad about myself, and therefore feel shame. According to Taylor
(1985, p. 28–32), in this context the adverb “closely” for Hume
means that there must be something about this object or situation
that can have an impact on one’s sense of self. There has to be
what she calls a relationship of belonging, a relationship that
allows for identification: for whatever reason, the subject has to
perceive that her or his identity is at stake or affected in this
situation. Pride- and shame-inducing objects and situations will
vary depending on culture, character, personal values and so on,
but they will share this capacity of impacting one’s sense of self.
This idea of relation, however, seems to be in need of
further exploration. On the one hand, the way in which your
achievements, for example, reflect on yourself and allow for self-
assessment can be seen as rather unproblematic: they reveal some
positive qualities of yours, like your hard-working determination,
or your talent, or what have you. Even Hume’s example of the
4Hume does not use the word “shame,” but rather the word “humility.” He takes
pride and humility to be the two opposite emotions, of positive and negative self-
assessment, respectively. From his discussion it is clear that he uses both terms very
broadly, and that shame not only falls within the scope of what he calls humility,
but also is the most natural current term for many of his examples of humility.
Therefore, in what follows, we take his claims about humility to apply to shame.
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man who is proud of his house (Hume, 1978, p. 310–311) can be
construed along these lines: his choice of house might be seen as
revealing the man’s exquisite taste or his good social position, and
thus granting a positive self-assessment. But, on the other hand,
what about feeling proud of other people’s qualities, actions or
achievements? Do these not rather reflect on these other people?
Why should they reflect on oneself instead and cause pride?
And yet, this happens all the time. If your daughter won the
Nobel Prize instead of you (and you got to see it), you would
probably feel equally proud, if not even prouder, than if you
won it yourself. Indeed, many parents often feel proud of their
children for everyday achievements, and it is not rare for many of
us to feel proud of others: of our close friends or family members,
of members of our community that do admirable things, of the
sports team we support, and so on.
If it is true that we can feel proud or ashamed for actions that
others have performed (or sometimes even qualities they have),
how are these cases to be squared with the standard account? Or
does this mean the standard account has to be dropped and a
new one that does justice to this fact is to be devised (cf. Helm,
2010, p. 106)? We do not think so: the standard characterization
of shame and pride as self-conscious picks out a distinctive
phenomenological feature of these experiences, and is supported
by developmental (Reddy, 2008) and evolutionary (Maibom,
2010) evidence. Shame and pride, as opposed to other emotions
that involve assessments of others (like disdain, indignation,
or admiration), are both characterized by a specific form of
self-experience: they throw us back upon ourselves in a way
other emotions don’t do, they make us feel exposed (cf. Sartre,
1969, p. 252–303; Zahavi, 2012). Developmentally, they start
as reactions to experiencing other people’s attention to oneself
(Reddy, 2000, 2008), and evolutionarily they seem to descend
from mechanisms to signal that an individual is assuming a
specific status vis-à-vis another as a way of regulating conflict
(Maibom, 2010). Motivationally, they imply opposite tendencies
to hide ourselves (shame) or to show off (pride), and these do not
change significantly when we are ashamed or proud of someone
else. A typical reaction to feeling ashamed of someone would be to
retreat from the situation or make oneself as invisible as possible,
and alternatively to hide any link to the shameful subject. As
for taking pride in others, most people have encountered proud
parents and grandparents who can’t help boasting about their
children. This boasting is in most cases significantly different
from praising someone one admires: compare the case of a
proud parent with the attitude one might take in recommending
to one’s friends the concert of a talented musician one just
discovered. Pride and shame of others still is phenomenologically
self-directed in some sense. The aim of the following Section,
therefore, is to clarify in which sense this is the case and to defend
the standard account.
At this point, one might object we are forgetting an important
ingredient: social appraisals, i.e., the important impact that the
experienced or anticipated reactions of others (their thoughts,
emotions, and actions, etc.) to the situation at stake and our
emotions about it can have on the way we experience that
situation, and thus shape our very emotions (Manstead and
Fischer, 2001). Social appraisals often feature in our emotions
and alter them significantly, and they may perhaps explain how
we can come to feel ashamed or proud of others. Now, it is
undeniable that social appraisals play a role, but they do so too
for standard cases of shame and pride: we don’t see a significant
difference here. In mature adults, there can perhaps be cases of
solitary shame or pride, where all that is at stake is the individual’s
own independent self-evaluation, but other people’s attention to
and evaluations of oneself feature centrally in most instances of
these emotions, they are essential for their developmental genesis,
and they greatly increase their felt intensity. Granted: our sense
of self is less individualistic than some approaches to emotion
seem to assume, i.e., it is essentially relational (Manstead and
Fischer, 2001, p. 224). And many situations can make us feel
associated with others through social appraisals. But what does
this association consist in? The aim of this paper is precisely
to clarify how exactly this relationality gets expressed in hetero-
induced shame and pride.
Let us now take a step back to the idea that shame and pride
are self-conscious emotions. There are at least two ways in which
the claim about the self-reflectivity of these emotions can be
defended in the light of their hetero-induced forms. The first is to
recur to a reductivist strategy and to argue that there is nothing
genuinely specific about the hetero-induced emotions depicted
in the examples above. Section 2 begins by applying this strategy
to pride induced by others’ actions and rejects its conclusions.
But then, if these emotive responses are to be vindicated as
genuine instances of pride, how is one to explain them? The
second way to preserve the standard account, and the one we
endorse in this paper, is by supplementing it with a theory of
group identification; to feel what in the following will be called
‘hetero-induced’5 shame and pride, the subject has to group-
identify with the individual acting admirably or shamefully. It is
because the subject understands herself as belonging to the same
group to which the admirable or shameful agent belongs that
she feels pride or shame – accordingly, these emotions would
still be about the self, but the self at stake is the social self of
the experiencing subject. Put differently, this form of pride is
pride of oneself qua member of a group, the group to which the
shame- or pride-inducing agent is perceived to also belong. As
(perceived) members of the same group, the emoting subject and
the agent that causes the emotion would share a social identity,
which enables the subject to feel that self-conscious emotion.
A linguistic remark before addressing all this in more detail.
Although we do not consider this paper as a contribution to
ordinary language philosophy, we would like to point out that
some natural languages have expressions that, to some extent,
track the specificity of the emotions we are after. This is especially
5We use this qualification to distinguish cases like those under considerations in
this paper from ‘collective’ pride or shame, i.e., from emotions that, allegedly, are
felt by a group and, hence, are collective (cf. Sullivan, 2014). If considered from
a linguistic point of view, collective emotions would be expressed by sentences
of the form ‘we feel emotion φ;’ hetero-induced emotions, by contrast, come in
the I-form ‘I feel φ [pride or shame] of myself [because of you].’ Some social
psychologists also refer to ‘hetero-induced’ emotions as ‘group-based’ (as opposed
to “collective,” cf. Lickel et al., 2011) – we employ the former expression here
because, as pinpointed below, although we contend all hetero-induced emotions
require (group-)identification with the other, we also argue that not all of them are
based on an actually existing group.
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the case for hetero-induced shame, which to some extent can be
expressed by the German singular term ‘Fremdscham’ and by
the Spanish ‘vergüenza ajena.’ Also, the Italian language allows
the compound expression ‘vergognarsi di qualcuno,’ which is
reflexive. The language of pride is not equally rich,6 but some
romance languages, like Spanish, do use reflexive structures
to refer to hetero-induced pride: ‘enorgullecerse de alguien.’
English does not allow for this, however, and the English
expressions ‘being proud of someone’ and ‘being ashamed
of someone,’ which will be used in the following, might be
taken as misleadingly suggesting that the intentional object of
these emotions is someone else (instead of its very subject).
Interestingly, the English use of the expression ‘being ashamed,’
which can be said either of the emoting subject or of the one
inducing shame, reflects the way in which the Japanese term
(hazukashii) is used – as both can be applied either
to the subject feeling shame or to the individual that causes
shame in an experiencing subject. But this is just to show that,
although ordinary language may be granted the first word in the
description of emotions, it seldom has the last. Put another way,
the aim of this paper is not to describe how the best speakers of
one or the other language use these emotion terms, but rather to
understand the structure of these experiences. Hence, it is now
high time to turn to the phenomena themselves.
BEING PROUD OF YOUR DAUGHTER
Back to the example: Your daughter wins the Nobel Prize (or,
perhaps, much more ordinarily, and yet not less moving, she
takes her first steps) – and you feel an emotion that, from all
angles, feels and looks very much like pride. But then you might
wonder in which way you have contributed to that event to the
effect that you, yourself, now feel proud because of it. In other
words, the following problem arises: given that pride is a self-
conscious emotion (directed back toward the emoting self), then
it is not clear how it comes about that you, yourself, feel proud –
of yourself! – in the light of an event to which you have not
contributed in any way. A first way to tackle the problem is by
denying that here one is confronted with a case of pride, or by
arguing that, on close examination, such cases do not really differ
in any way from standard non-puzzling examples of pride. In
particular, it could be argued (a) that this emotive response is
an emotion of pride tout court to be aligned to standard cases
of pride; or maybe (b) that this is a somewhat mystified emotion
of admiration (i.e., an emotion which is a cognate with – and yet
different in kind from – pride); or (c) that this is an emotion of
pride that has not been elicited in the ‘standard’ way, but rather
by a process of emotional contagion; or (d) that this scenario,
again, involves an emotion of pride – but that this is a “fictional”
form of pride. In this paper we scrutinize these four attempts,
reject all of them and develop an alternative account – one that
retains the phenomenological credentials of this emotion and yet
6As Kristjánsson (2010, p. 83) remarks, it is a well-documented fact that the
language of positive emotions is far less nuanced than the language of negative
ones. As he says, “there are, it seems, fifty ways to feel bad for every one to feel
good!”.
accommodates its hetero-induced form by enriching the standard
account with a theory of group identification. Let us remark at
this stage that the claim is not that the aforementioned options
are unable to model certain forms of pride – quite the contrary:
they capture phenomena that are real and perhaps even frequent.
Rather, the claim is that none of these options can account
satisfactorily for the most paradigmatic examples of feeling proud
of someone else and, hence, that they leave this phenomenon
unexplained.
We begin by excluding the first reductivist move as a blunt
non-starter. If presented with this example, one might argue that,
since you are her parent, your daughter’s achievement reveals
to you your good parenting skills (in the same way that your
choice of house may reveal your excellent taste, as in Hume’s
example). However, this interpretation just doesn’t do justice to
this experience. To claim that, in feeling proud of your daughter,
you just focus on yourself and your parenting skills, simply fails
to capture the crucial sense in which her and her achievement
feature as central in your experience.
But then, could hetero-induced pride simply be a form of
admiration? If, in the example at stake, there is an important
sense in which you are proud of your daughter and you are
focusing on her and her achievement, then one could perhaps
claim that, the target being another person, there is nothing here
but admiration (and not pride), where ‘admiration’ is understood
as a positive emotion in response to, in this case, an outstanding
person (cf. Schindler, 2014). And yet, it seems that the feeling at
issue is fairly different from mere admiration. You might very
much admire the previous Nobel Prize winners, but you are
not likely to feel proud of them (although you might, under
some conditions we specify below). Feeling proud of someone
else, as opposed to admiring them, preserves the phenomenal
qualities of self-expansion and self-assessment: the winner is not
just any excellent scientist, it’s your daughter. Something good
about yourself is after all revealed. It seems clear that, derivatively,
and without losing sight of the fact that it’s her achievement, not
yours, you feel good about yourself, and probably even inclined
to boast about it.
Are we then facing a ‘standard’ case of pride that, however, has
been caused in a somewhat peculiar way? Put differently, even
if one grants that the emotion at stake in the example is of the
kind of pride, one could still try to water-down its peculiarity by
arguing that, in these cases, we just face an emotion triggered by
emotional contagion. Emotions can be “infectious” (cf. Goldie,
2000, p. 189), they can pass from one individual to another by
means of contagion. Think, e.g., of how your mood can easily
be contaminated by the jolly atmosphere of a bar, once you
enter it. Similarly, one could claim that hetero-induced pride
is nothing else than individual pride that has passed from one
individual to one another. This thought might be promoted by
the frequent use of the adjective “vicarious” to designate hetero-
induced emotions (cf. Lickel et al., 2005; Welten et al., 2012;
Yamawaki et al., 2015). But as Scheler (1987) rightly pointed
out, there is a crucial difference between what he considers
properly vicarious emotions, i.e., emotions caused by contagion,
and genuine forms of hetero-induced emotions. Consider how
the explanation in terms of emotional contagion falls too short
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of our example of feeling proud of your daughter: first, you don’t
need to witness anybody else feeling proud in order to feel that
emotion yourself. Imagine, for example, that before anyone had a
chance to break the news to you, you read a newspaper headline
announcing your daughter as the winner of that year’s Nobel
Prize. Reading this headline, just learning that she was awarded
the prize, is very likely to make you feel proud, with no need
for you to witness or imagine her feeling proud. What you are
feeling is your own emotion, not something you picked up from
somebody else. In addition, and most crucially, it could even be
that your daughter is not feeling pride (maybe because she has a
very humble character), but you do, and this would invalidate the
appeal to emotional contagion in the very first place.
Another possibility to maintain the idea that the emotive
response at stake is pride, while yet denying that there is anything
specific about it, is to argue that these are cases of “fictional”
pride, i.e., cases of an emotion that one can come to feel by
putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes. This is something that
happens often when we enjoy works of fiction and identify with
a character: sometimes we come to feel what the character feels,
while keeping a sense that we are not really that person and that
the states of affairs represented in the fiction do not obtain. This
is why Walton (1978) famously (and controversially) argued that
what we experience here are “quasi-emotions.” Mechanisms like
this might also be at play, for example, when we see someone
do something dangerous and we feel afraid. But does this really
explain hetero-induced pride?
To begin with, there is a prima facie difference between
fictional and hetero-induced emotions: fictional emotions seem
to require that you put yourself in somebody else’s situation,
while hetero-induced emotions arguably do not require this, for
they arise out of your own situation.7 To see the difference this
makes, consider these following scenarios. While watching Ridley
Scott’s Alien in the cinema, you may feel very intensely a range
of fictional emotions, including fear. This is partly because the
way in which the fiction is constructed leads you to put yourself
in the characters’ position and feel the emotions appropriate
to their situation. But you are very unlikely to feel afraid if
someone simply told you the film is about a crew of astronauts
trapped in a spacecraft with a murderous alien creature that hunts
them: you need more than this to put yourself in the position
of the astronauts. By contrast, you don’t need to put yourself in
your daughter’s shoes to feel proud of her. When you read the
newspaper headline announcing her prize, there is no need for
you to adopt her perspective toward that event, so that you can
feel the pride that would be adequate to her own situation. Put
another way, you don’t need to simulate her pride in yourself.
This emotion is your own: it arises from your situation. This
signals an important difference between feeling the pride that
your daughter feels, or would potentially feel (in which case the
emotion would be purely “fictional” in the above sense), and
feeling proud of your daughter, which is your feeling (and hence,
a hetero-induced emotion in our sense).
7These remarks merely highlight one key aspect that distinguishes paradigmatic
cases of emotions elicited by fiction from hetero-induced ones. They are not
supposed to specify our position in the debate on the nature of emotional responses
to fiction.
If these considerations are correct, they show that
hetero-induced pride is an emotive response with a specific
phenomenology. Again, the hypotheses reviewed and rejected
above describe phenomena, like fictional emotions, that we
believe are possible, perhaps frequent. They may be routes
through which some actions and features of others can have an
impact on our self-conscious emotions. But they fall short of
explaining some of the most paradigmatic examples of pride
induced by others, which qualifies as a genuinely specific emotive
response. But this opens the question of how, then, one is to
explain this emotion.
As already suggested, one way to look at hetero-induced
emotions is to argue that the subject, to feel this emotion, needs to
group-identify. But what does that exactly mean? To illustrate this
idea, it might be important to appeal to an established paradigm
in social psychology, generally labeled “Social Identity Theory,”
according to which individuals do not only have a personal
identity, they also have one or more social identities or social
selves. One’s social identity does not have to be conceived as
something different from one’s personal identity – rather, one’s
social identity could be said to be a part of one’s personal identity.
The social self can be intended as the representation one has
of oneself qua member of a group. One straightforward way to
look at it is by connecting it to the process of self-categorization
(Brewer and Gardner, 1996).
Self-categorization seems to be elicited by the individuals
starting to perceive of themselves as being similar to others in
a certain respect or as sharing certain properties with others.
The properties can be of a manifold nature: social properties
such as “being an African American,” “being a phenomenologist,”
“being an Anglican,” “being an anarcho-syndicalist” can be used
to characterize oneself, e.g., within an academic, political or a
religious context. But empirical evidence (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al.,
1971) seems to show that even much more minimal properties
(in the sense of properties negligible in usual contexts) like
“preferring Beethoven to Mozart” or “preferring Paul Klee to
Wassilj Kandinski” could acquire salience and be put at the
basis of self-categorization. When this occurs, so-called ‘minimal
groups’ arise – these are groups that have a purely cognitive
existence in the sense that they exist only in the mind of the
individuals, as it were.
What seems to be important for the purposes of this
paper, however, is that the mere understanding of belonging
to a class or group, i.e., to the group identified by a given
property (e.g., the class of analytic philosophers, the class of the
Beethoven enthusiasts, etc.) is not yet per se to identify with that
group (Bennett and Sani, 2008). The subject, who is aware of
exemplifying certain properties, does not yet have to articulate
her experiences by using the first person plural pronoun or, said
another way, to frame the situation she is in according to a we-
perspective. In a sense, the subject does not yet live through the
group from within and the mere idea of belonging to a specific
class of individuals does not necessarily affect the way in which
one behaves, feels or thinks. But this is exactly what it means
to see oneself as a member of a we or, even, to adopt a we-
perspective, which appears to imply a peculiar switch from a
mere spectator to a participatory perspective. Indeed, a wealth
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of psychological literature identifies marked predispositions to
altruism toward in-group members, to emotional sharing, to
sympathy, to collective actions, to we-talk, etc. (Turner, 1987,
p. 50) as quintessential byproducts of group identification.
If group identification can be triggered by, but does not
coincide with, self-categorization, then it might well be the case
that self-categorization is just one among many routes that
lead the subject to adopt the we-perspective. Indeed, in certain
cases, dyadic forms of intentionality (as instantiated in face-
to-face communication, e.g.) can lead the individuals involved
conceiving of themselves as us (cf. Zahavi, 2015). And perhaps
other processes or situations as well could be argued to be
conducive to group identification (Bacharach, 2006, p. 76). We
will come back to this notion in the following Sections, but for
the present purposes, suffice it to say that, once the individual
has group identified, the subject’s self-consciousness undergoes
a specific transformation: the self is now sublated under a we, a
we to which also others are sublated and to which the self feels
attached. In other words, the individual has acquired a social self,
i.e., she now has a representation of herself qua member of us.
Against this background, we are now in a position to
provide an account of hetero-induced pride, which converges in
some important respects with some psychological theories about
intergroup, or group-based, emotions (Smith et al., 2007; Ray
et al., 2014).8 When you feel proud of your daughter, the emotion
is still about yourself, your self, but this is about your self insofar
as it is your social self. Seeing yourself as a member of a group,
the actions and/or achievements of the other members acquire
relevance when it comes to assessing your social self, and this
is what triggers the emotive response (cf. Lickel et al., 2007).
Accordingly, it is precisely because the Nobel Prize has been won
by a close member of your group – namely of your family – that
such an achievement has relevance for you and for the way in
which you assess yourself.9
8Despite our obvious agreement with this psychological account, it seems to leave
some important questions about group-based self-conscious emotions unasked
and undertheorized, mainly because it doesn’t take into sufficient account the
peculiarity of self-conscious emotions we address here (however, cf. also Lickel
et al., 2005, 2007). Taking it into account, and asking how exactly a self-conscious
emotion can become group-based, or hetero-induced, based on a process of group
identification, puts on the table issues of attributability and responsibility that pave
the way to exploring the adequacy criteria of group-based self-conscious emotions
and their consequences for moral psychology. We will not explore the latter two
topics in this paper, but these are clearly related to the first one, i.e., the issue about
group identification. As we emphasize below, group identification does not appear
to require the actual existence of a group (cf. also Montes Sánchez and Salice,
forthcoming). But if that is the case, then what are the conditions of adequacy for
hetero-induced self-conscious emotions? When, in other words, can these emotive
responses be said to be ‘appropriate’? One suggestion could be that at least one
of these conditions is related to group membership – for the subject to elicit
an adequate emotion of this kind, it is not yet sufficient that the subject group-
identifies, for objective group-membership must also be in place. Yet, this certainly
represents only one within a whole set of further conditions, which we are not in a
position to explore here. This, again, has an impact on questions related to moral
psychology: why should the virtues and vices of other people have an impact on the
individual’s self-evaluation? Isn’t it healthier and more mature to be autonomous
in this respect? Problematizing the origin of hetero-induced shame and pride as
this paper is aiming at doing, is, we believe, a first necessary step to start clarifying
questions like these. (We thank one anonymous reviewer for pushing us on these
points.)
9But suppose that someone who, prima facie, is not member of your group
has reached the admirable result. Is it yet possible for you to feel proud of
At this stage, note that the emphasis on the self-conscious
nature of hetero-induced emotions does not amount to
disregarding the role that the other (your daughter, in the
example at stake) plays within the intentional structure of the
emotion. After all, if this emotion is induced by others, there
must be an intentional relation that the emotion is required to
enter with such others. Yet, it seems plausible to contend that
this relation is different from the one entered by the self of the
emoting subject. The latter fills the emotion’s target position (just
as, in fearing the dog, the dog is in the target position): it is your
self (as group member) of which you are proud. By contrast, the
former, the other person, is in what has been called the “focus’s
position” of the emotion – where the focus can be characterized
as a “background object having import to which the target is
related in such a way as to make intelligible the target’s having the
property defined by the formal object” (Helm, 2010, p. 58). Put
differently, it is in virtue of the focus of the emotion (i.e., the other
and her actions) that the target of the emotion (i.e., the social self)
acquires the property defined by the formal object (for instance,
being admirable).
Putting the social self in the target position of the emotion
might allow explaining a certain variance in the phenomenology
of these affects. In certain cases, the self-referentiality of these
emotions is immediately reflected in the way in which the
emotion is felt by the subject – e.g., consider cases in which a
fan feels proud of him- or herself because his or her sport team
has won the match: the fan generally attempts to underline the
fact that he or she shares the same social identity with the team
(this example will be discussed further in Section 3). In others, by
contrast, it is the other who appears to play a more ostensive role.
To see this, consider how parents feeling pride of their children,
while talking to other parents, direct the hearers’ attention to their
children rather than to themselves (and yet these still are their
children).
Interestingly, the phenomenological difference between these
cases manifests itself in degrees and does not impose itself as
clear-cut. It is difficult to pinpoint when, exactly, the other’s
position in the emotion turns from an implicit to an explicit
or ostensive (and vice versa). This seems to suggest that
an explanation of this oscillation between implicitness and
explicitness should be given in terms of emphasis rather than
in terms of two intentional structures that are instantiated by
two different kinds of hetero-induced affects. More precisely, we
propose that, in some cases, the emotion of pride (or shame)
is “more” centered on the subject, while, in others, it is “more”
centered on the other. But this oscillation occurs – and is
grounded in – the social self that is and remains the proper target
of the emotion: in the first scenario, the phenomenological accent
her? Answering this question presupposes a clarification of the notion of group
membership, which goes beyond the purposes of this paper. However, in previous
work (Montes Sánchez and Salice, forthcoming) we have argued that the process
of group identification, although it can establish group membership, does not
necessitate group membership, meaning that it seems possible for a subject to
identify with a group without him or her yet being member of that group (or even
without there being a group in the very first place). If that is the case, given certain
psychological preconditions, it might be possible for a subject to feel pride for the
actions of individuals that, although do not actually belong to the same group as
the subject, are nevertheless considered by the subject to be members of her group.
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is put on me being the member of the group to which the other
belongs. By contrast, in the second case, the phenomenological
accent is put on the other being the member of the group to which
I belong. If this correct, then these two allegedly different targets
of the emotion just are two poles of one and the same target (the
social self).
GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND ITS
UNDERLYING MOTIVATION
If this line of thought is so far correct, there appears to be
a form of pride, i.e., hetero-induced pride, that is based on
group identification. Hence, complementing the theory of self-
conscious emotions with a theory of group identification seems
to be a germane move insofar as it helps shed light on a specific
form of such emotions. But is there any insight about group
identification that one could gain by considering this notion in
the light of the self-conscious emotions that this process can
contribute to trigger?
Before tackling this question, it might be helpful to emphasize
a point made above: “objective” group membership, i.e., the
fact that one objectively belongs to a class or group defined
by a socially salient property, does not automatically lead to
subjective identification with that group. One can be perfectly
aware of working for a given company, for example, and not
feel any particular inclination to identify with it or frame its
actions or interventions in the public sphere in we-terms. Put
another way, one can be a member of a group without forming
a (corresponding) social self. Conversely, in some situations it is
possible for people to identify with groups to which in principle
they do not belong, or that do not exist in any robust sense,
or whose borders and defining properties seem so blurry as to
throw serious doubt on whether one can call them groups or not
(think again of the abovementioned “minimal group” scenarios).
It seems therefore clear that group identification does not always
neatly align with group membership. If this is the case, then what
leads people to group-identify?
The foregoing analysis of hetero-induced pride could tempt
one to think that group identification is triggered by a desire
to share a positive social identity – since the subject intends to
share a social identity that is perceived as positive and admirable,
she begins to understand herself as a group member or, in
other words, she group-identifies with another individual. Some
researchers have argued that, at least in paradigmatic cases,
a crucial assumption to be made in order to explain group
identification is that “individuals strive to maintain or enhance
their self-esteem: they strive for a positive self-concept” and
that this principle sustains the idea that “individuals strive to
achieve or maintain positive social identity” (Tajfel and Turner,
1986, p. 16). If considered under the light of hetero-induced
pride, this assumption has high plausibility. Indeed, it might
seem tempting to conclude that group identification is always
motivated by a desire to belong, which aims at assimilating the
positive qualities of others and attributing them to oneself (cf.
also Brewer and Gardner, 1996). Roughly, the idea would be
that group identification is the result of some sort of practical
reasoning, where one of the premises is the desire of being
associated with a positive group’s identity. The scheme of such
reasoning could run along the following lines:
(i) The subject believes that a given individual (or a given
group, for that matter) is associated with positive qualities,
(ii) The subject desires to be associated with those qualities,
hence,
(iii) The subject group-identifies, i.e., she starts to think of
herself as member of the same group to which the other
individual belongs (or to the group tout court).
Once the condition pointed by (iii) is achieved, the positive
emotion of hetero-induced pride is triggered. Indeed, something
quite close to this form of reasoning seems to happen fairly often.
In the social psychology of sports, there are two well established
phenomena: basking in reflected glory (BIRGing) and cutting off
reflected failure (CORFing). Some empirical research has shown
that people are much more likely to wear team paraphernalia and
talk about the sports team they support in “we” terms (“we won”)
the day after a victory than the day after a defeat. After a defeat,
the tendency is to speak about “they” instead: “the team played
badly” (cf. Cialdini et al., 1976; Snyder et al., 1986; Bizman and
Yinon, 2002). This might explain why hetero-induced pride is so
frequent.
However, not everyone agrees, and for good reasons. What if
the self-conscious emotion that is induced by others’ behavior
is negative? The phenomenon of CORFing seems to show that
people tend to dissociate from others in this case.10 But is
this always so? What if, e.g., the subject feels shame for what
others have done? If something like hetero-induced shame exists
and if its explanation has to appeal to the notion of group
identification, this would suggest that the social self can – but
does not have to – be the result of a psychological process driven
by the desire to establish a positive social identity. But if that is
the case, then the desire to “maintain or enhance self-esteem”
or even the struggle “for a positive social identity” would be
extrinsic to group identification, i.e., it would be an element
that could facilitate or, as it were, grease group identification,
but which is not necessary for this process to occur. To test
this idea, let us now turn our attention to hetero-induced
shame.
BEING ASHAMED OF YOUR DAUGHTER
As explained above, shame can be described as a self-conscious
emotion involving a negative self-assessment. One is typically
ashamed of one’s defects, failures, or mistakes. But in the
same way that one can feel proud of others, one can also feel
ashamed of them, or so we will argue in this Section. Imagine it
turned out that your physicist daughter had fabricated the data
published in some of her more important papers, invalidating
all her contributions to science, and starting a scandal. In this
case, it is plausible to think that you would feel ashamed of
10We owe the ideas about CORFing and BIRGing to Gerhard Thonhauser and to
his work on sport fandom.
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her. Now, some of the objections discussed for pride might
apply to hetero-induced shame as well: perhaps this is after all
standard shame (shame of your bad parenting skills, of your
inability to instill good values in her), perhaps this emotion
is of an infectious type, i.e., elicited by emotional contagion,
or perhaps this is fictional shame. These objections have been
dismissed in the previous Section and the same responses given
for pride seem to apply equally well to shame. These arguments
will not be rehearsed here, but to recap some of their main
points: standard shame does not capture the role that the other
plays in the intentional structure of the emotion. Emotional
contagion requires the other to feel an infectious emotion
of the same kind, but this is not needed for hetero-induced
shame. Fictional shame presupposes some cognitive processes
that do not need to be in place in the case of hetero-induced
shame.11
In addition to those challenges, there are a couple of other
objections that are specific to the case of shame, partially because,
as mentioned above, the language of shame-related emotions is
more nuanced than the language of pride. These are: (a) such
cases are examples of indignation at shamelessness and (b) they
are examples of embarrassment, not shame. Let us look at each
one in turn.
Consider the idea that so-called hetero-induced shame is
actually indignation at shamelessness. The gist of this objection
would be that many cases of hetero-induced shame that, as
mentioned above, some languages refer to with words such as
‘Fremdscham’ or ‘vergüenza ajena,’ actually do not refer to a
shame reaction, but rather to an indignation-like response at
a display of shamelessness. If indignation tracks offense and
injustice, and therefore responds to a violation of what one
could call the code of guilt (cf. Nussbaum, 2006, p. 99–101), the
emotion under examination here would be an analog directed
at violations of the code of shame instead. When someone
behaves disgracefully, you would experience an aversive reaction
that implies a condemnation of that action. Some examples
might make this explanation plausible. Imagine that one evening,
while browsing TV channels, you stumble upon a particularly
outrageous reality show and, unable to bear watching the
behavior of the participants, you swiftly change the channel again.
It seems that the element of condemnation is here very prominent
and makes this idea attractive. However, such an explanation
11An interesting account of hetero-induced shame along fictional lines is developed
by Kutz (we are thankful to Olle Blomberg who has pointed us to Kutz’s theory).
According to Kutz, when individual shame is induced by others, this emotion
has to be explained by a combination of “basic shame and identification,” where
identification is understood as an “imaginative projection.” The idea is that, in
these cases, I feel ashamed “not for the other (. . .), but for myself as someone in
whom the same shameful characteristics are likely to be expected by association”
with whatever category the other belongs to (cf. Kutz, 2000, p. 44). It seems that,
although this can happen, it does not have to. To use Kutz’s own example, it could
be that, “while in a restaurant in a foreign country, I hear another tourist loudly and
abrasively, I hide my guidebook in shame,” but this happens not, as Kutz argues,
because I feel I could instantiate the same shameful characteristics of the category
“tourist,” for I could be adamantly certain that I would never act in the same way.
Rather, and as it will be suggested below, the shameful actions of the other gain
relevance for my social self, because the other is perceived as being a member of
the same group to which I belong. Insofar as the other performs actions that are
shameful for the group I identify with, they are shameful for me, too.
doesn’t seem to capture the other scenario introduced above:
there is a difference between finding out that the fraudster is just
some random person (which can grant indignation) and finding
out it is your daughter. Just as admiration, which is exclusively
externally directed, is not equivalent to hetero-induced pride,
indignation is not equivalent to hetero-induced shame: the
crucial idea here is that hetero-induced shame retains a feeling of
your own involvement with the shameful subject and can make
you wish to hide from others, even though you are not the one
who behaved shamefully. And all this is not preserved in mere
indignation.
But then, is hetero-induced shame perhaps better described
as embarrassment? This objection would run as follows: there
is another emotion that is closely related to shame, but with
some peculiarities that help accommodate the examples just
presented, namely embarrassment. Embarrassment is another
negative self-conscious emotion, but it is milder and more
contextual. While shame has a deeper and longer-lasting impact
in the subject’s self-esteem, because it touches on her qualities,
embarrassment is typically a feeling of being out of place or
awkward in a social situation, and it generally disappears without
impacting the subject’s sense of self after the situation is over (cf.
Nussbaum, 2006, p. 204–206). While in shame one experiences
oneself as being at fault or inferior, in embarrassment one merely
experiences oneself as being socially out of place. Therefore
embarrassment, as opposed to shame, which can be felt in
solitude, always requires an audience: someone has to be directly
witnessing the situation. And once the actual social exposure
is over, embarrassment usually wanes quickly without leaving a
sense of degradation. Due to the centrality of contextual elements
in embarrassment, one might think that it is easier for situations
to evolve in ways that potentially leave one out of place through
no fault of one’s own. Imagine that, when you first introduce your
new romantic partner to your family, one of your siblings starts
telling stupid and inappropriate jokes. This might put you in a
socially awkward position, but you don’t have to construe it as
reflecting on your character. So, the objection would go, your
feelings in this case are better described as embarrassment rather
than shame.
Now, the first response to this would be that, as Miller (1985,
p. 28) claims, emotion terms are not so effortlessly applied to
experiences as concepts such as “chair” or “table” are applied
to objects, and thus it is problematic to assume that emotion
terms designate clear-cut areas of experience. Boundaries are
blurry, and there are often wide areas of confusion and overlap
between closely related emotions. This is the case of shame and
embarrassment, which belong to the same emotional family,
they resemble each other, and embarrassment can sometimes
slide into shame, if the socially awkward situation is perceived
as revealing some flaw of yours. The above example might
plausibly look like embarrassment (although this situation could
elicit hetero-induced shame too, if you group-identify with your
sibling), but it is much harder to see how an explanation in
such terms can do justice to our introducing example. Imagine
that you read about your daughter’s fraud case in the press
while alone in your living-room. This would plausibly give rise
to a shame-like emotion. What would justify classifying it as
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embarrassment instead? There are no witnesses that make this
situation socially awkward, the emotion cannot be avoided by
removing yourself from the social context, and the evaluation
involved surely would go beyond a feeling of being out of
place. We therefore think that there are paradigmatic cases of
hetero-induced shame that cannot be explained in terms of
embarrassment.
At this point, it seems one can conclude that hetero-induced
shame is a genuine phenomenon that cannot be explained away
or reduced to a different phenomenon. It has a specificity vis-
à-vis regular shame, but it still shares the core of its intentional
structure, i.e., it is directed at the emoting subject. The difference
can be argued to be that hetero-induced shame, just like hetero-
induced pride, relies on a mechanism of group identification.
You feel ashamed of your daughter because you perceive her
as a member of a group that you also belong to (your family)
and this is relevant for your social identity. You are ashamed of
yourself qua member of that group because she threw a negative
light on it. Conversely, and perhaps even more poignantly, the
daughter could be ashamed of her father/mother because of
his/her alcoholism.12
GROUP IDENTIFICATION IN THE LIGHT
OF HETERO-INDUCED
SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS
The last tessera of the mosaic being at its place, one can now get
back to the question regarding the nature of group identification.
Is it the desire to create or maintain a positive social identity
one of the keys to understanding group identification, as some
have argued? Although the positive quality of hetero-induced
pride could be taken to speak in favor of this idea, the fact that
hetero-induced shame is an emotion that involves a resolutely
negative evaluation of the shameful subject seems to invalidate
the hypothesis. And the argument seems to be the following:
since shame responds to features and traits that are perceived
to be negative, the hypothesis at stake would predict that the
subject does not desire to be associated with them. And yet,
there are genuine cases of hetero-induced shame that can’t be
avoided by the abovementioned strategy of CORFing. Now, if the
explanation of these cases, at least according to our suggestion,
requires appeal to the process of group identification, then the
conclusion to infer is that group identification does not draw
upon the desire to establish a positive social identity – at least not
necessarily.
12Further support to these ideas comes from psychopathology and, in particular,
from two independent studies conducted about schizophrenia. The first study
highlights that the self-disorders that constitute the Gestalt of schizophrenia (and
especially: ontological dissimilarity, loss of common sense, transitivism, quasi
solipsistic experiences; on these cf. Parnas et al., 2005) impair the patients’ ability
to group-identify (cf. Salice and Henriksen, 2015). The second study illustrates that
patients with schizophrenia have difficulties in feeling hetero-induced shame (or
Fremdscham tout court, given that the study was conducted in Germany, cf. Krach
et al., 2010). Jointly taken, these two studies seem to confirm the link between
hetero-induced shame and group identification.
This conclusion, however, could be resisted based on the
following line of reasoning. It might well be that hetero-
induced shame presupposes group identification, but this does
not militate against the hypothesis that group identification is
triggered by a desire to achieve a positive self-identity. Once a
social self has been established, one can come to feel negative
self-conscious emotions induced by other group members, but
this has no bearing on the mechanisms that prompted group
identification in the very first place. This objection seems very
plausible if one thinks of the paradigmatic cases of feeling
ashamed of one’s family members, where the subject arguably
has a social self before any hetero-induced self-conscious emotion
comes into play. If that is on the right track, it might still be
the case that the motivation underlying group identification is to
strive for positive self-identity.
However, cases like this, it seems, delimit only a mere sub-
class of hetero-induced self-conscious emotions. More precisely,
there are many cases of hetero-induced shame or pride where
the emoting subject does not have a previously established social
self and where, hence, group identification seems to occur in
concomitance with the emotions without presupposing any form
of previous (subjective) group membership (on this, cf. Montes
Sánchez and Salice, forthcoming). As an illustration, consider
these two examples:
– Someone who is not nationalist, nor at all interested in
football, gets carried away by the frenzy surrounding the
finals of the World Cup, where her country’s national team
is playing, and ends up watching the match. As it happens,
the team wins the competition and she feels proud. Neither
her nationality, nor football, had ever been a salient part of
her social identity in any situation, and yet in this particular
moment she feels hetero-induced pride.
– As you walk down the street one day, you see a beggar
sitting on the sidewalk a few meters ahead. Suddenly, the
man who was walking just in front of you spits on the
beggar. Upon seeing this, you feel ashamed. The man who
spit on the beggar is a complete stranger, someone you have
never seen before, and yet in this situation you feel ashamed
of him.13
These are cases where, arguably, the social self at stake in
the emotions was absent before the situation took place, and
where some feature of the situation seems to be triggering group
identification. In the first case, it is plausible to argue that the
person watching the match group-identifies because she desires
to associate to the positive qualities of the agents. But this pattern
of explanation cannot hold with respect to the second example.
Indeed, in that situation one might intensely desire to reject
the association, though one finds oneself unable to do that, as
hetero-induced shame evidences. In other words, if one strongly
wishes to dissociate from the man who spits on the beggar, then
how come one is group-identifying with him? In this case, it
does seem fairly implausible to argue that group identification
is motivated by the desire to acquire a positive social identity
and this provides additional evidence in favor of the suggestion
13This example is a variation of a scenario first portrayed by Henning Nörenberg.
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that group identification does not necessarily rest on this desire.
However, this being a mainly negative result, does it also have
a positive twist? The remaining of this Section is devoted to
mapping the terrain of three possible options.
To begin with, one could conjecture that – even if this
particular desire or, more precisely, a desire with this particular
content (to establish and preserve positive social identity) is
not necessary for the subject to group-identify – this process
still has to be triggered by a desire (the exact content of
which would still have to be specified). Were this correct, every
occurrence of group identification would have to be described as
an intentional activity – “intentional” understood in a very strict
sense, according to which this activity can only be caused by a
conative attitude. To the best of our knowledge, such a strong
claim does not find advocators in the literature. And maybe there
are good reasons for that. To come back to our previous example,
it seems possible to imagine scenarios in which one feels ashamed
for the actions of complete strangers – but if there is any desire
involved in this sort of case, it would be a desire to be dissociated
from the shameful agent. And it is hard to make sense of how
such a desire would elicit group identification.
Recently, a nuanced position has been suggested by Tuomela
(2013) in the context of decision-making theory. According to
Tuomela (2013, p. 195), in certain cases, but also only in certain
cases, group identification (or, in his parlance, the adoption of a
we-mode) is intentional. Although it has been pointed out that
this view is not without tension (Townsend, 2014; Petersson,
unpublished manuscript), it appears to fit the results of our
analysis: in fact, one could claim that relevant desires on the side
of the group-identifier do play a causal role for hetero-induced
pride, whereas no such desires can be ascertained in the case of
hetero-induced shame. This approach, however, would still have
to explain why in certain circumstances group identification is an
intentional process and why in other cases this description does
not hold. Note, however, that on this view group identification is
not necessarily intentional.
This leads to another possible solution of the problem – one,
that denies group identification ever being intentional and that
rather takes it to be a brute fact, which cannot be explained
further by recurring to conative attitudes of the subject (cf.
Bacharach, 2006, p. 86). On this view, the best that a theory of
group identification can achieve is to identify the psychological
factors that make group identification more likely. And these
would be the factors encompassing those briefly illustrated in
Section 2: social categorization, second person perspective taking,
common fate, etc. These psychological conditions may trigger
group identification, but none of them is able to exact this
process. Accordingly, group identification would be an arational
(and yet not irrational) process.
A systematic assessment of these accounts about group
identification would require consideration of several other issues,
touching upon theories as disparate as the theory of intentions,
of self and of agency, among other. This is a topic for another
paper, but it might be worth emphasizing that the account of
a hetero-induced form of self-conscious emotions propounded
in this article appears to be fully compatible with the last two
accounts presented.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have argued, on the one hand, that two important
self-conscious emotions, shame and pride, can be social in a
specific way, and on the other hand, that these phenomena
contribute to shed some light on the mechanisms underlying
group identification.
First, it has been claimed that shame and pride can be
hetero-induced through a process of group identification. This
shows that the evaluation of one’s social self can be impacted
by the evaluations deserved by other members of the group
with which one identifies. In other words, one’s self-evaluation
does not exclusively depend on one’s own actions and features;
it is interlinked with those of others – insofar as they are
considered members of the same group to which the subject
ascribes herself. From the point of view of moral psychology,
if one thinks about self-evaluation in moral terms, this might
seem problematic. Why should the actions of others have an
impact on my moral self-evaluation, if I’m not responsible
for them? Answering this question in detail would require a
discussion of collective responsibility and a proper investigation
into the conditions of appropriateness of hetero-induced shame
and pride, all of which greatly exceeds the scope of this
paper. Let us just say that we believe hetero-induced emotions
can be appropriate in some cases, and this should be taken
into account by moral psychology: our moral self is not self-
encapsulated, as some prominent discussions of the moral role
of shame and guilt seem to assume (cf. Tangney and Dearing,
2004).
Second, it has been shown that the possibility of feeling
hetero-induced shame in certain situations casts serious
doubts on the idea that group identification is triggered
by the desire to maintain a positive social identity. Such
desire can contribute to make group identification quicker,
easier, or more likely, but this is by no means necessary
for it to happen. We have suggested some alternative
pathways that might lead to group identification, but a careful
investigation of them will have to remain the subject of further
research.
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